More people died in Europe's heat this fortnight than in the fortnight's wars, and the heat made almost no noise, and that asymmetry is worth examining, because it reveals something about how our institutions actually allocate their alarm, and the something is not flattering, and it is not, as we like to tell ourselves, about how much a threat kills. It is about whether the threat arrives with a face.
The literary scholar Rob Nixon coined a phrase for the kind of harm that our attention is structurally unable to hold: slow violence, the violence that is not spectacular and immediate but gradual and dispersed, that occurs not as an event but as an accretion, and that is therefore, despite often killing far more people than the dramatic kind, systematically under-attended by a public and a political system geared to spectacle. Slow violence, Nixon argued, poses a representational problem: it does not photograph, it does not resolve into a single moment or a single perpetrator, it lacks the narrative grammar of villain and victim and climax that our institutions and our media require in order to mobilise, and so it proceeds, lethal and unattended, beneath the threshold of a response that is reserved for harms that come with a face. A heat wave is slow violence in its purest form. It kills thousands, but it kills them one at a time, invisibly, in overheated apartments, without a perpetrator to blame or an image to broadcast, and so it does not command the response that a war a fraction as lethal commands instantly.
Let me give the counterargument its real due, because there is a serious one and it is not mere callousness. Institutions must triage; attention and resources are finite; and there is a genuine case that an acute, deliberate threat like a war, which can escalate and spread and be stopped by decision, rightly commands more urgent response than a diffuse environmental one that no single decision can halt, because the war is tractable to action in a way the heat is not. This has force. Not every disparity of attention is a moral failure; some is rational triage. But notice that the argument proves less than it claims, because it assumes the heat is untractable, and it is not: the deaths in a heat wave are overwhelmingly preventable, by cooling centres, by warning systems, by retrofitted housing, by the boring apparatus of adaptation, exactly as the deaths in a flood are preventable by sirens, and the failure to build that apparatus is a choice, not a necessity. The heat is not untractable; it is merely undramatic, and we have mistaken the absence of drama for the absence of a lever, and let thousands die of a thing we knew how to prevent because preventing it generated no story.
And here is the deeper point, the one that should trouble anyone who cares about how a society governs itself. The bias is not really fast-versus-slow, or even tractable-versus-intractable; it is dramatic-versus-undramatic, and a political system that responds to drama rather than to magnitude is a system that will reliably misallocate its care, pouring its resources toward the threats that photograph well and starving the ones that kill quietly, regardless of the actual toll. This is a governance failure of the first order, and it compounds, because the undramatic catastrophes are precisely the ones, climate chief among them, that are growing, so that a system tuned to drama is tuning itself to attend less and less to the threats that matter more and more. The heat this fortnight killed more than the wars. It will kill more again next summer, and more the summer after, and it will keep making no noise, because it has no face, and a public and a politics that respond only to faces will keep looking away, toward the dramatic and the tractable, while the faceless thing does the actual killing.
So the challenge the heat poses is not really to our air conditioning; it is to our capacity to govern threats that refuse to behave like villains. Everything about our institutions, our media, our attention, our very moral psychology, is built to respond to the deliberate, the sudden, the perpetrated, and almost nothing in them is built to respond to the diffuse, the gradual, the merely emergent, and the great catastrophes of this century are increasingly of the second kind. We know how to mobilise against an enemy. We do not know how to mobilise against a trend, and the trend, this fortnight, killed more than the enemy, quietly, without a face, while we watched the war and the football, and it will go on doing so until we learn the hardest lesson a dramatic species can learn, which is to fear the thing that kills without a villain as much as we fear the villain, and to build against it with the same seriousness, before the summer that kills not two thousand but twenty, and still, for want of a face, makes no noise.